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Abstract    
 
A growing body of literature indicates that competition increases bank soundness. Applying an industrial 
organization based approach to large data sets for European and U.S. banks, we offer new empirical 
evidence that efficiency plays a key role in the transmission from competition to soundness. We use a two-
pronged approach. First, we employ Granger causality tests to establish the link between competition and 
measures of profit efficiency in banking, and find that competition indeed increases bank efficiency. 
Second, building on these results, we examine the relation between the Boone indicator [Boone, J. (2001) 
Intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate. IJIO, Vol. 19, pp. 705-726], an innovative 
measure of competition that focuses on the impact of competition on performance of efficient banks, and 
relate this measure to bank soundness. We find evidence that competition robustly increases bank 
soundness, via the efficiency channel.  
 
 
Keywords: bank competition, efficiency, soundness; market structure; regulation 
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This paper investigates a possible transmission mechanism by which higher 
competition can contribute to increased bank soundness. A large body of literature 
investigates the nexus between competition and bank soundness. While the relevant 
literature points towards negative-trade offs between competition and bank soundness 
(e.g., Keeley, 1990; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000; Hauswald and Marquez, 
2006), more recent theoretical and empirical studies (e.g., Koskela and Stenbacka, 2000; 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Carletti, Hartmann, and Spagnolo, 2007) report 
beneficial effects of bank competition on bank soundness. However, these studies do not 
analyze the underlying transmission mechanism by which competition can contribute to 
enhanced bank soundness. The current paper aims to fill this gap by focusing on efficiency 
as the possible conduit.  
Our line of reasoning is as follows. Industrial organization literature finds that, at least 
among non-financial firms, competition positively affects efficiency (e.g., Tirole, 1998; 
Hay and Liu, 1997). At the same time, the banking literature suggests that efficient banks 
have incentives to engage in proper screening and monitoring of borrowers (e.g., Petersen 
and Rajan, 1995), and are characterized by lower levels of non-performing loans (e.g., 
Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004). To link these two lines of research, we 
perform two interrelated sets of analyses. First, we examine how competition among 
banks impacts on their efficiency, and, second, we relate a measure of competition that 
also captures efficiency, to bank soundness.  
We collect data for Europe and the United Stats during 1995-2005. The data cover 
more than 3,600 banks from ten European countries, and more than 8,900 banks for the 
U.S. The reason for our focus on Europe is that it provides a fertile ground for analyzing 
the effects of changes in the intensity of competition. In the early 1990s, European banks 
have experienced dramatic changes in the regulatory environment aimed at creating a 
level playing field for competition among banks. These changes included the 
implementation of several EU banking directives (in particular the Second Banking 
Directive, which came into force on 1 January 1993) and the introduction of a ‘single 
passport’ allowing banks to operate across all EU member countries with standardized 
procedures for acquiring licenses, capital requirements, and supervisory guidelines. These 
changes in the institutional setting had substantial ramifications for competition among 
European banks. To cross-check the results from the European dataset, we analyze the 
U.S. dataset. 
To analyze the transmission from bank competition to soundness, we pursue a two-
step approach. In the first step, we establish the causality between competition and profit 
efficiency in banking. Specifically, we use Granger causality tests to examine the link 
between competition, measured by a Lerner index, and various measures of efficiency. The 
Granger causality tests indicate a positive effect of competition on measures of standard 
and alternative profit efficiency. When examining cost efficiency, we also find that 
competition positively affects cost efficiency in the U.S. 
In the second step, we employ the Boone indicator (Boone, 2001), an innovative 
measure of competition that focuses on the impact of competition on performance of 6
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efficient banks, and relate this measure to bank soundness. Specifically, we use 
instrumental variable estimation techniques and relate the Z-score (a measure of bank 
soundness popular in the recent literature) to the Boone indicator (an innovative measure 
of competition based on the idea that a competitive environment increases efficiency of a 
bank, and ultimately its market share). The findings from the second set of analyses 
indicate that increased competition robustly increases bank soundness for the European 
sample via the efficiency channel. Our analysis for the U.S. sample also points towards a 
positive effect of competition on bank soundness through the efficiency channel.   
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that policies supporting 
competition in banking are beneficial because they are associated with increased profit 
efficiency. In other words, more competitive banks will also be more successful in 
allocating resources more efficiently to society. Our analysis gives empirical support to 
pro-competition policies such as the single banking passport (which simplified cross-
border operation of banks) and the third pillar of Basel II (which puts emphasis on the 
disclosures that the bank must make, increasing the role for market discipline in 
monitoring and enforcing efficiency and soundness). 
 7
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“if banks were strengthened by the gymnastics of competition, the  
banking system would be stronger and more resilient to shocks.” 
 
Padoa-Schioppa (2001, p. 16) 
I.  Introduction 
Recent years have been marked by a shift in theory and empirical evidence on the effect 
of competition on bank soundness. While the earlier literature points predominately 
towards a negative trade-off between competition and bank soundness (e.g., Keeley, 1990; 
Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006), recent theory and 
evidence suggest a positive link between the two (Koskela and Stenbacka, 2000; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Boyd and de Nicolò, 2005; Schaeck, ýihák, and Wolfe, 
2006; Carletti, Hartmann, and Spagnolo, 2007; Schaeck and ýihák, 2007).1  
In this paper, we investigate the transmission mechanism by which competition 
translates into greater degrees of soundness, and provide further evidence for the positive 
link between the two. To this end, we utilize an innovative measure of competition, the 
Boone (2001) indicator, which allows us to offer an industrial organization-based 
explanation for the positive impact of competition on banking soundness.  
Industrial organization literature indicates that competition increases efficiency of 
firms (e.g., Tirole, 1998). At the same time, the banking literature suggests that more 
efficient banks have better screening and monitoring procedures in place, and are 
consequently less likely to suffer from non-performing loans (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 
1995; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004). Based on these arguments, we 
hypothesize that efficiency could be the conduit through which competition makes banks 
more financially sound.  
The correct identification of the underlying transmission mechanism by which 
competition translates into bank soundness has important bearing for safety and 
soundness regulation. First, uncovering the primary transmission channel allows focusing 
regulatory and supervisory actions more precisely. Second, policymakers will obtain 
feedback on i) how changes in the regulatory environment affect bank efficiency, and ii) on 
how efficiency affects bank soundness. Third, the findings from our analyses indicate 
possible directions for future policymaking regarding competition in banking.  
We use a two-pronged approach to investigate the envisaged transmission mechanism 
from competition to soundness. First, to examine a direct link between competition and 
efficiency, we employ Granger causality tests to examine the link between competition, 
measured by a Lerner index, and efficiency.2 The benefit of Granger causality analysis is 
that it permits examining the intertemporal relation between competition and efficiency. 
Second, we analyze the effect of competition, through efficiency, on bank soundness. For 
this analysis, we use the Boone (2001) indicator, an innovative measure of competition 
developed in the industrial organization literature. This indicator is based on the 
                                                 
1 Carletti and Hartmann (2003) and Berger et al. (2004) offer detailed review articles on the links between 
competition, concentration and stability in banking. 
2  Recent work by Casu and Girardone (2007) examines the link between cost efficiency and Lerner indices 
for commercial banks in Europe. Their findings indicate that the effect of competition on cost efficiency is 
not clear-cut. In contrast, Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2008) use efficiency adjusted Lerner indices and 
find robust evidence that banks with more market power are the most efficient ones.  8
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efficiency hypothesis developed by Demsetz (1973) and gauges the strength of the 
relation between efficient banks (measured in terms of their marginal costs) and 
performance (measured in terms of bank market shares).  
We examine our hypotheses using two datasets: a European dataset with more than 
3,600 banks, and a U.S. dataset with more than 8,900 banks; both samples cover the 
period 1995–2005. We cover Europe because it provides a fertile ground for analyzing the 
effects of changes in the intensity of competition. In the early 1990s, European banks have 
experienced dramatic changes in the regulatory environment aimed at creating a level 
playing field for competition among banks. These changes included the implementation of 
several EU banking directives (in particular the Second Banking Directive, which came 
into force on 1 January 1993) and the introduction of a ‘single passport’ allowing banks to 
operate across all EU member countries with standardized procedures for acquiring 
licenses, capital requirements, and supervisory guidelines. These changes in the 
institutional setting had substantial ramifications for competition among European banks. 
To cross-check the results from the European dataset, we analyze the U.S. dataset.  
Our results from the Granger causality tests provide evidence that increases in 
competition precede increases in bank profit efficiency in Europe and in the U.S. We also 
find evidence that competition positively affects cost efficiency in the U.S. These findings 
are largely insensitive to the way efficiency is measured, and robust to using alternative 
lag structures, and controlling for other factors that determine efficiency.  
The analysis using the Boone indicator is in line with the hypothesis that the positive 
effect of competition on bank soundness reflects increases in bank efficiency. An important 
policy implication of our results is that policies promoting bank competition may have a 
positive impact on efficiency and soundness. Examples of such pro-competition policies 
include the single banking passport (which simplified cross-border operation of banks) 
and the third pillar of Basel II (which greatly increases the disclosures that the bank must 
make, increasing the role for market discipline in monitoring and enforcing efficiency and 
soundness).  
The structure of the paper is the following. We present our hypotheses in Section II. 
Section III provides an overview of the dataset, the variables used to measure competition 
and efficiency, and the estimation procedures. Section IV reports the empirical results. 
Section V offers concluding remarks.   
II.  Hypotheses on Competition and Efficiency 
Based on industrial organization theory, and informed by the empirical banking 
literature, we develop hypotheses for the relation between competition and efficiency. We 
focus on competition as the starting point because we are interested in how competition 
affects bank soundness.   
 
The ‘Competition-Efficiency’ Hypothesis 
Under the ‘competition-efficiency’ hypothesis, increases in competition precipitate 
increases in profit efficiency. This hypothesis is adapted from the efficient structure 
hypothesis proposed by Demsetz (1973). Consider an exogenous shock (e.g., deregulation 
under the Second EU Banking Directive) that forces banks to minimize costs, offer 9
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services at lower prices, and at the same time forces them to increase profits, e.g. through 
shifts in outputs.3 Efficient banks (i.e. those with superior management and production 
technologies, that translate into higher profits) will increase in size and market share at 
the expense of less efficient banks. This is likely to lead to higher market concentration 
(Vander Vennet, 2002). In contrast, uncompetitive markets allow bank managers to enjoy 
a ‘quiet life’ whereby costs are not kept under control, leading to lower levels of efficiency 
(e.g., Pagano, 1993; Berger and Hannan, 1998). Under this hypothesis, we expect 
competition to Granger cause efficiency.4  
The ‘Competition-Inefficiency’-Hypothesis is the alternative to the ‘competition-efficiency’ 
hypothesis. It suggests that competition leads to a decline in bank efficiency. There are 
several reasons for why this might be the case. First, higher competition is likely to be 
associated with less stable, shorter relationships between customers and banks (Boot and 
Schmeits, 2005) as customers’ propensity to switch to other providers increases in more 
competitive environments. This phenomenon will amplify information asymmetries that 
require additional resources for screening and monitoring borrowers. Second, since banks 
can expect a shorter duration of bank relationships in a competitive environment, they are 
likely to reduce relationship-building activities, which inhibits the reusability and value of 
information (Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1986). Taken together, these arguments 
suggest a reduction in the value of proprietary information held by banks, meaning that 
banks incur greater expenses in retaining old and attracting new customers through 
investments into ATMs, new information systems, and aggressive marketing efforts. 
Evanoff and Örs (2002), DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchhoff (1998), and Kumbhakar et al. 
(2001) provide some empirical evidence for adverse effects of competition on bank 
efficiency. Thus, the alternative hypothesis implies that competition Granger causes 
decreases in bank efficiency.  
In evaluating the ‘competition-efficiency’-hypothesis, we primarily focus on profit 
efficiency because the concept of profit efficiency is more closely aligned with the goal of 
profit maximization in that it requires that just as much managerial attention is paid to 
raising a marginal dollar of revenue as is paid to decreasing a marginal dollar of cost 
(Berger and Mester, 1997) (see Section III for a further discussion). 
The ‘Prudent and Efficient Management’-Hypothesis 
The  ‘prudent and efficient management’ provides a rationale for the ‘competition-
efficiency’ hypothesis. The theoretical underpinnings for the ‘competition-efficiency’ 
hypothesis can be found in a range of studies. In particular, Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
argue that in institutions exposed to more intensive competition, screening and 
monitoring procedures are more sophisticated, whereas banks in monopolistic markets 
spend less on monitoring. Similarly, Chen (2007) develops a theoretical model showing 
that competitive banks have better screening and monitoring procedures in place and are 
therefore less likely to suffer from nonperforming loans. This result is obtained since less 
risky borrowers have an incentive to obtain financing from a bank that can differentiate 
                                                 
3  This interpretation also suggests that resources are more efficiently allocated to the benefit of society 
(Besanko and Thakor, 1993). 
4  In a related study, Casu and Girardone (2006) hypothesize that more efficient banks ensure the 
competitiveness of a banking system and examine the impact of efficiency on competition. However, their 
empirical findings show little evidence supporting the idea that efficiency would affect the level of 
competition in major European economies.  10
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between good and bad credit risks, because good borrowers can reap benefits in the sense 
of better access to credit and higher credit lines. Institutions that maintain efficient 
monitoring and screening procedures avoid additional costs that arise in inefficient 
institutions due to resource-intensive monitoring of delinquent borrowers, analysis of 
workout arrangements, and seizing and disposing of collateral do not pose major 
problems in the more efficient banks. These theoretical arguments are reinforced in 
empirical studies by Wheelock and Wilson (1995), Berger and DeYoung (1997), Kwan 
and Eisenbeis (1997), and Williams (2004) who show that unsound banks suffer from high 
levels of inefficiency. Likewise, Koetter and Porath (2007) demonstrate that more efficient 
banks in Germany have lower risk and are sounder than their less efficient counterparts. 
We refer to this hypothesis as the ‘Prudent and Efficient Management’-Hypothesis, and 
expect the Boone indicator to be negatively related to bank soundness.5  
The ‘Poor and Inefficient Management’-Hypothesis is the alternative to the ‘Prudent and 
Efficient Management’-Hypothesis. This hypothesis states that competition adversely 
impacts bank efficiency, resulting in a negative effect on bank soundness. Consider a case 
where efficiency declines as outlined under the ‘competition-inefficiency’ hypothesis. Such 
institutions are preoccupied with retaining old and attracting new customers at any 
expense. Consequently, insufficient resources are allocated to underwriting standards, and 
screening and monitoring of borrowers (e.g., Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2005). Such banks 
are unlikely to employ sophisticated credit scoring models and might lack skills in 
appropriately assessing the value of collateral. This results in a high proportion of loans 
with low or negative net present values, which ultimately affects bank soundness 
negatively. Thus, inadequate underwriting standards and insufficient resources devoted to 
increasing profits result in increased inefficiencies, which is likely to give rise to unsound 
bank operations. Berger and DeYoung (1997) offer evidence that poor management, 
reflected in banking inefficiencies, precedes higher levels of nonperforming loans. 
Similarly, DeYoung (1997) finds that asset quality and efficiency are related via 
management quality. Under this alternative hypothesis, the Boone indicator would enter 
the regression equations positively.    
 
 
III.  Data and Methodology 
Data 
We use two datasets, both covering the period 1995–2005: a European dataset with 
more than 20,300 bank-year observations for over 3,600 banks, and a U.S. dataset with 
over 42,300 bank-year observations for more than 8,900 banks. These two samples 
complement each other. The European sample covers a number of countries with different 
institutional settings. We control for such different characteristics when we study the 
effect of competition on efficiency and, ultimately, on bank soundness. The U.S. sample 
allows us to examine the consistency of our inferences by exploiting cross-sectional and 
                                                 
5  Note that the Boone indicator is decreasing in the degree of competition (see Section III). Consequently, if 
competition increases bank soundness, the relation between measures of bank soundness and the Boone 
indicator can be expected to be negative.  11
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time-series variation in measures of competition, efficiency, and soundness by focusing on 
a large number of banks that operate in a more homogenous regulatory environment.  
The bank-specific data are derived from BankScope, a commercial database provided by 
Bureau van Dijk. The European sample covers Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom, and includes all commercial, savings, and cooperative banks during 1995–
2005.6 The U.S. sample includes commercial, savings, and cooperative banks for the same 
period. Whenever possible, we use consolidated data to avoid double counting. The HHI 
and total banking system assets are also computed from BankScope data. For the U.S. 
sample, we calculate the HHI and banking system assets on the state level. The benefit of 
sampling the institutions for 1995–2005 is that the data cover a complete business cycle.  
We drop observations for which the respective variables lie in the 1st or 99th percentile 
of the distribution, and exclude countries with less than 20 bank-year observations. The 
remaining dataset for Europe consists of 20,300 bank-year observations for 3,665 banks, 
of which 5,959 are savings banks, 10,268 are cooperative banks, and 4,082 are commercial 
banks. The remaining U.S. sample has 44,991 bank-year observations for commercial 
banks, 5102 savings banks, and 13 cooperative banks.  
  Measuring Efficiency  
To measure efficiency, we primarily focus on profit efficiency, which has the benefit of 
taking into account performance not only on the cost side, but also on the revenue side of 
the bank business. This concept is superior to cost efficiency, which is also used in the 
literature, but this concept only looks at the cost side of bank business. This distinction is 
relevant in the analysis of competition, because banks can compete not only through 
cutting costs, but also through adjustments in revenues. In addition, profit efficiency can 
be thought of as the superior concept as it embraces cost efficiency, and hence an 
evaluation of profit efficiency simultaneously entails an evaluation of cost efficiency. In 
other words, changes in profit efficiency associated with competition not only incorporate 
whichever changes in cost efficiency occur but also extend to revenue effects of changes in 
output (Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey, 1997). We use two measures of profit 
efficiency: standard profit efficiency and alternative profit efficiency.  
Profit efficiency measures how close a bank gets to the efficiency frontier, which 
denotes the maximum achievable profit, given a particular level of input and output prices 
(Berger and Mester, 1997). In log-form, the standard profit function can be written as  
  ʌ ʌ İ u w,p,z f ș ʌ ln ln ln             ( 1 )  
where  denotes variable bank profits. We add the constant T  to the bank profits, to avoid 
taking the log of a negative number (without losing anything of substance); the price 
vector of the inputs is denoted by w, and the vector of output prices is denoted by p;  z  
indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs (inputs or outputs), ln S H  is a random error 
term, and ln S u  is the inefficiency term that reduces profits. This specification assumes 
that output prices are taken as given but does not assume that output quantities are fixed. 
                                                 
6  An anonymous referee suggested focusing more on suvirvorship bias, an issue not discussed by most of 
the other literature that uses the BankScope database, but examined recently by Gropp and Heider (2008). 
We have looked into the issue, which turns out to be limited for our country sample, reflecting the small 
number of true banking failures in Europe in the last decade. 12
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Hence, the dependent variable allows both varying inputs as well as varying outputs. In 
this setup, output prices are exogenous, allowing for inefficiencies in output choice as a 
response to prices or to other arguments in the profit function.  
Evaluating the effect of competition on profit efficiency based on the concept of 
standard profit efficiency imposes a number of restrictive assumptions. Standard profit 
efficiency assumes variable output quantities, perfectly competitive output markets, 
accurate measurement of output prices, and that no differences exist in the quality of 
banking products (Berger and Mester, 1997).  
To address these restrictions, we focus on the concept of so-called alternative profit 
efficiency (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). Rather than measuring how close a bank is to the 
efficiency frontier given its output prices, the alternative concept gauges how close the 
bank is to the efficiency frontier given its output levels. The alternative profit efficiency 
function is identical to Eq. (1), except that it replaces p  with  y, denoting the output 
quantities. This different setup of the equation allows variable output prices to vary freely 
and affect profits so that the function is written as  
   S S H T S a a u z y w f ln ln , , ln      .       (2) 
The effect of the change in specification is that we obtain different values for the error 
term ln aS H and the inefficiency term ln a u S . Both standard and alternative profit efficiency 
are defined as the ratio of predicted actual profits to the predicted maximum profits the 
institution could earn if it were to be based on the efficiency frontier.  
To estimate profit efficiency, we use stochastic frontier techniques that allow us to 
decompose the error term into two parts. The first part of the term captures random 
disturbance, and follows a symmetric normal distribution. The second part of the error 
captures inefficiency, and follows a positive half-normal distribution. The frontier 
functions are estimated for each country separately, because differences in the 
environment banks operate in hamper the estimation of a common frontier. We use a 
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As highlighted above, we add the constantT , calculated as   
min
33 33 ln / / 1 WE WE SS  ªº ¬¼ to 
the profit P  to avoid taking the log of a negative value. Output quantities (loans and 
other earning assets) are denoted by the vector Y,  W is the vector of inputs (labor, 
funding, and other costs), and netputs (fixed assets, loan loss provisions, and equity 
capital) are represented by the vector E. To impose standard homogeneity conditions, we 13
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scale all profits and input prices by one other input price (labor costs), and adjust for 
heteroskedasticity and scale biases by scaling by one of the netputs (equity capital).7  
For completeness, we also run our analysis with the concept of cost efficiency. Cost 
efficiency measures of how close the bank’s cost is to the best-practice bank’s cost, if it 
would produce the same output bundle under the same conditions (Berger and Mester, 
1997). The cost function is similar to the profit functions above and is written as  
 C C u z y w f C H ln ln , , ln     ,        (4) 
where C are variable cost; uc is an inefficiency term that raises cost above the level of the 
best-practice bank, and ec is the random error term. The other terms are identical to those 
used in the estimation of the alternative profit efficiency scores. A bank’s cost efficiency 
ranges between 0 and 1, with larger values indicating greater cost efficiency.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables we use to estimate translog cost 
and profit functions. The samples in Panel A (European sample) and Panel B (U.S. 
Sample) exhibit similar properties. On average, total costs amount to 5 percent of total 
assets. In terms of alternative and standard profit efficiency, we find that the banks 
operate close to the efficiency frontier. The average European and U.S. bank in the sample 
loses approximately 13 or 14 percent of the profits it could be earning due to 
inefficiencies,8 and the average European bank is slightly more cost efficient than an 
average U.S. bank, but the difference is insignificant. We capture labor cost with the ratio 
of personnel expenses to total assets, funding costs as the ratio as interest expenses to 
total deposits and other borrowed money, and other operating and administrative 
expenses are used to proxy for the input price of fixed assets.  
 [TABLE 1]   
  A traditional measure of competition: Lerner index 
As a starting point in assessing the degree of competition in banks, we use the Lerner 
index of market power. The Lerner index is a well-established measure of the degree of 
competition in banking. It captures the divergence between product prices and marginal 
cost of production, which indicates the degree of market power. We calculate the Lerner 








            (5) 
where pit denotes the output price of bank i at time t and is defined as total revenue 
(interest and noninterest revenue) divided by total assets. Marginal cost  it mc are obtained 
by differentiating a translog cost function with one output (total assets) by output (see 
Appendix A). The Lerner index ranges between zero and one, whereby larger values 
indicate less competition and more market power.  
[FIGURE 1] 
                                                 
7  The translog functions for each country can be obtained from the authors on request.  
8   A detailed breakdown of the efficiency scores for each country can be obtained from the authors on 
request. Note that profit efficiency can take on negative values because banks can lose more than 100% of 
their potential profits (Berger and Mester, 1997).  14
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Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the Lerner indices, by country, over time. It shows 
a slight upward trend for bank market power. The banking systems in Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, and Germany exhibit on average the lowest values for the Lerner index, 
indicating that banks in these markets do not wield much market power.  
  Granger causality tests and variables 
To investigate the direct effect of competition on efficiency, we analyze the nexus 
between the two alternative measures of profit efficiency and the Lerner index.  
In a similar vein to Berger (1995), Berger and DeYoung (1997), and Williams (2004), 
we use Granger causality tests as follows 
0( 1 )( )
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      ¦¦       (6) 
and regress measures of profit efficiency on lags of both itself ) , ( 2 1   t t y y , and on a 
Lerner index ( 2 1,   t t x x ) as a measure of competition;  it Z is a vector of control variables; 
i K is a bank-specific effect and  it H  denotes the error term. We also run the regressions 
with the Lerner index as dependent variable and regress it on lags of both itself and lags 
of the measures of profit efficiency. For this analysis, we employ a panel data estimator 
with bank-fixed effects.  
We use two annual lags in the baseline setup of our models. This lag structure avoids 
dropping a vast amount of information by using deeper lags. Granger causality analysis 
focuses on the F-Test for the joint significance of the two annual lags of x. If the two 
annual lags are significant, we can predict that  x Granger causes y , in the sense of 
changes in  x preceding changes in y . Granger causality however does not constitute 
causality in the economic sense. Similar to Berger (1995), we hone in on the sum of the 
lagged coefficients, because we are interested in the total effect of competition on profit 
efficiency over the two-year period. To test whether the inferences from the basic setup 
are indeed causal in the Granger sense or merely spurious, we augment our regression 
specifications with a number of control variables.  
Since we are predominantly interested in the effect of competition on efficiency, we 
choose control variables that are likely to affect efficiency. First, we include market share 
(log), total assets (log), asset growth, and squared asset growth into the Granger causality 
analysis. We expect that a bank’s market share is positively related to profit efficiency 
because banks that are large relative to their relevant market can charge higher prices for 
their services (Berger and Mester, 1997). In contrast, profit efficiency of banks is 
frequently found to decrease in bank size, as larger banks have bigger difficulty in 
generating revenue efficiently (Stiroh, 2000; Berger and Mester, 1997). We also 
investigate the effect of asset growth. An expanding bank may not keep its efficiency 
under control and we therefore anticipate an inverse relation between asset growth and 
profit efficiency. We include a quadratic term to account for nonlinearities, since the effect 
of growth is likely to be different for aggressively growing institutions. 
Second, we incorporate a Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on total assets to control 
for the degree of concentration in banking, and include a set of country dummies to soak 
up variation on the country level. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) show that profit 15
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efficiency is positively affected by concentration in banking markets because banks can 
increase net revenues by exerting market power, and Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey 
(1997) find that mergers among large U.S. banks enable the merged entity to improve 
profit efficiency, a finding that they assign to benefits from diversification. Since we 
compare Herfindahl indices across different markets, we also include the log of total 
banking system assets to control for the size of the different systems (Breshanan, 1989).  
  An innovative measure of competition: the Boone indicator 
An alternative way of measuring competition is the Boone indicator (Boone, 2001; 
Boone, Griffith, and Harrison, 2005). Unlike the Lerner index, the Boone indicator allows 
to capture more directly the link between competition and efficiency. It is based on the 
efficient structure hypothesis that associates firm performance with differences in 
efficiency. The basic idea is that more efficient firms achieve superior performance in the 
sense of higher profits or higher market shares, and that this effect is increasing in the 
degree of competition.   
Following Boone, Griffith, and Harrison (2005) and van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007), we 
can write a banking system demand function in which bank i produces a product qi so that  
 , ij i i j ji p qq a b q d q z z   ¦         (7) 
whereby each bank has constant marginal cost ci. It is assumed that a > ci and 0 < d  b. 
To maximize profits, the bank decides on the optimal output level qi so that 
 ii i i p cq S            (8) 
The first order condition for equilibrium is then given by  
20 ij i ij ab q d qc
z     ¦ .          ( 9 )  
For a banking system with N banks that produce positive levels of output, one obtains 
N first order conditions (3)  
       () 2/ 1 2/ 1 / 2 1 2/ 1 ii i j j qc bd a bd N c c b dN bd ªº ªº          ¬¼ ¬¼ ¦ . (10) 
Eq. (10) illustrates that there is a linear relation between output and marginal cost, and 
Eq. (8) indicates that profits depend on marginal cost in a quadratic way. If profits i are 
defined as variable profits excluding entry costs k, a bank will only enter the market if, 
and only if, i  k. 
Based on the properties outlined above, competition increases in such a banking system 
for two reasons: First, competition will increase in circumstances when the products 
offered by different banks become closer substitutes, i.e., d increases (assuming that d < b). 
Second, competition will increase if entry costs k decline. Boone, Griffith, and Harrison 
(2005) prove that market shares of more efficient firms increase under these two different 
regimes. The Boone model for the market share s of bank ican then be characterized by 
the following two equations: 
/
i ii j j j s pq pq   ¦  and         ( 1 1 )  16
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 ln ln / ii j j s cc DE   ¦ ,         ( 1 2 )  
where E  is referred to as the Boone indicator. 
Market shares increase for banks with lower marginal costs (E <0). Thus, an increase 
in competition raises the market share of a more efficient bank relative to a less efficient 
one. The stronger the effect (i.e., the larger theE  in magnitude), the stronger is 
competition. The log-log specification in Eq. (12) is used to deal better with 
heteroskedasticity. In addition, this form also simplifies interpretation because it 
illustrates the elasticity of the market share to a one percent change in the Boone 
indicator (see also van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007). For instance, an estimated E  of -2 
indicates that a bank with one percent higher marginal cost than another, more efficient 
bank would have 2 percent smaller market share than the more efficient bank.   
Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) argue that one of the distinct features of the Boone 
indicator is that it is demonstrates why measures such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) do not fare well as measures of competition. The intuition of the HHI is derived 
from a Cournot model with symmetric banks, where a fall in entry barriers decreases the 
HHI. But if banks differ in terms of efficiency, increases in competition through an 
increase in d reallocate output to the more efficient banks that already had higher levels of 
output. Consequently, an increase in competition raises the HHI rather than decreases it 
as is often assumed under the so-called structure-conduct-performance paradigm.  
 
  Estimating the Boone indicator  
As the first step to computing the Boone indicator, we calculate marginal cost, and 
replace the dependent variable in the translog function in Eq. (3) with total costs and 
differentiate the modified Eq. (3) with respect to the two output categories, loans and 
other earning assets. We obtain 
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which are the marginal costs of loans and of other earning assets, respectively.  
In the second step, we estimate the relation between individual banks’ market shares 
and marginal cost of production to obtain the Boone indicator as outlined in Eq. (12). We 
use a GMM-style estimator with two year lagged values of the explanatory variables as 
instruments to address concerns that market shares and marginal cost are jointly 
determined. For instance, banks that are large relative to the system might benefit from 
lower marginal cost of production due to market power.   
To address changes in competition over time, we estimate the Boone indicator 
separately for each year in each country (Figure 2). We focus on the Boone indicator 17
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obtained for the loan market as traditional intermediation business still is the prevailing 
type of business the banks are engaged in.  
 [FIGURE 2] 
  Bank soundness and the Boone indicator 
In this section, we use the Boone indicator to explore the predictions from the ‘Prudent 
and Efficient Management’-Hypothesis to establish the transmission mechanism by which 
competition impacts on bank soundness. To this end, we estimate a general class of panel 
data models of the form 
ijt jt ijt jt ijt ZB X C D EJ GH      ,         (15) 
where Zijt is a measure of bank soundness for bank i in country j at time t, Bjt is the 
Boone indicator in country j at time t, and X and C are vectors of bank- and country-
specific variables to control for other factors that impact on bank soundness. The error 
term is denoted by  ijt.  
We use an instrumental variables estimator for Eq. (15) to address potential 
endogeneity of the measures of bank soundness, the Boone indicator, and one of the 
control variables, bank size. The Boone indicator and bank size are likely to be partially 
endogenous because more fragile institutions tend to ‘gamble for resurrection’ by 
increasing their risk-profile via the origination of risky loans, which by itself, can be 
interpreted as a sign of increased competition. Moreover, the Boone indicator could be 
affected by entry of new institutions that offer substitutes of banking services, thus 
forcing banks to manage costs more efficiently and lowering the Boone indicator.  
Natural candidates to instrument the Boone indicator are the individual bank’s market 
share and the degree of financial freedom in a country. The latter is measured by the 
Financial Freedom Index obtained from the Heritage Foundation. This index is designed 
to measure banking security and independence from government control (ranging from 
0=no freedom to 100=maximum freedom), and is an excellent instrument for the Boone 
indicator, because state ownership and interference not only tend to increase inefficiencies 
but also affect competition in banking. The individual bank’s market share also satisfies 
the excluding restrictions because it is likely to affect bank soundness indirectly through 
either the efficiency channel or bank size. Finally, we use fixed assets to total assets to 
instrument the two endogenous variables because a high level of fixed assets is likely to 
reflect that the bank has a wide ranging branch office network that can serve as an 
indicator for both market power and size.9  
To measure a bank’s financial soundness, we use the Z-score, calculated as  




    ,          ( 1 6 )  
 where ROA is the bank’s return on assets, E/A is its equity to asset ratio and  ROA V  is 
its standard deviation of return on assets computed over the sampling horizon. The Z-
score became rather popular in recent literature (e.g., Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007; 
Stiroh, 2004a, 2004b; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt, 
                                                 
9  The first stage regressions are reported in Appendix B.  
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Detragiache, Tressel, 2006; ýihák and Hesse, 2008). For a robustness test, we also use the 
standard deviation of ROA as a dependent variable. 
There are several reasons for the z-score’s popularity as a measure of bank soundness. 
First, it combines banks’ buffers (capital and profits) with the risks they face (measured by 
the standard deviation of returns) in a way that is grounded in theory. In particular, it can 
be shown that the Z-score is inversely related to the probability of a financial institution’s 
insolvency, i.e. the probability that the value of its assets becomes lower than the value of 
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dROA N A E ROA p ) 1 , 0 ( ) / ( , where z is the Z-score. In 
other words, if returns are normally distributed, the Z-score measures the number of 
standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to deplete equity. Even if ȝ is 
not normally distributed, z is the lower bound on the probability of default (by 
Tchebycheff inequality). A higher Z-score therefore implies a lower probability of 
insolvency (e.g., Boyd and Runkle, 1993), providing a direct measure of banks’ soundness 
that is superior to, for example, analyzing only banks’ leverage.  
Second, an important practical advantage of the Z-score is that it can be computed in 
an easy and transparent fashion for all banks in the sample as only accounting information 
is needed (in contrast, market-based measures such as distance to default require markets 
that are non-existent or illiquid for many of the banks in our sample).  
Third, empirical studies confirm that the Z-score is indeed a useful measure of bank 
soundness. For example, ýihák (2008), using a sample of 29 countries, including 12 with 
systemic banking crises, finds that banks in theses crisis are characterized by significantly 
lower Z-scores than other banks. Similarly, when we juxtapose our U.S. sample with 
FDIC data on individual bank failures, we find that the mean z-score in failed banks was 
less than ¼ of the z-score in the rest of the sample (doing a similar analysis for European 
banks is difficult given the lack of comprehensive database on bank failures in Europe). 
 In the regressions, we use total assets to control for bank size as larger banks are 
likely to be subject to regulators’ too-big-to-fail policies (Mishkin, 1999). The equity ratio 
and asset growth are included to account for differences in the banks’ risk preferences 
(Stiroh, 2004a). We include the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets as a measure of 
asset quality. To account for the fact that better diversified banks are assumed to be less 
risky (Diamond, 1984), we control for diversification, measured by a diversification index 
proposed by Laeven and Levine (2007).10  
  The HHI is included to reflect on a growing body of research indicating that 
concentration and competition measure different characteristics of banking systems (e.g. 
Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Thus, while the Boone indicator takes into consideration the 
effect of competition, we additionally control for the effect of market structure, using the 
HHI. Given that comparing concentration indices across markets necessitates taking the 
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effect of market size into account, we also include total banking system assets (Breshanan, 
1989). This reflects that a HHI may be smaller for mathematical reasons in larger 
markets since more banks can operate in larger markets. 
To account for the macroeconomic setting in the different banking markets, we include 
GDP per capita and the real interest rate. Those regressions that are run with a random 
effects estimator additionally include country dummies and bank type dummies for 
savings banks and cooperative banks. Commercial banks are captured in the intercept to 
avoid perfect collinearity. Table 2 provides an overview of summary statistics of all 
variables used in the analysis. 
[TABLE 2] 
IV.  Empirical Results 
This section reports the main results and sensitivity tests. We start with the discussion 
of the ‘Competition-Efficiency’-Hypothesis based on Eq. (6). Subsequently, we report the 
findings from the examination of the ‘Prudent and Efficient Management’-Hypothesis based 
on Eq. (15).  
  Testing the relation between competition and efficiency 
European Sample 
We run Granger causality tests to examine the nexus between competition and 
efficiency for the European sample. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 are based on two 
annual lags of the dependent and independent variable. In these baseline regressions, we 
only include market share (log) and total assets (log) as control variables. Although 
efficiency scores tend to be rather sticky over time, we find that the sum of the lagged 
coefficients for the Lerner index is negative and significant at the one percent level in 
column (1). This inverse relation between the Lerner index and alternative profit 
efficiency suggests that competition increases alternative profit efficiency as anticipated 
under the ‘Competition-Efficiency’-Hypothesis. Negative conditional correlation is indicated 
by the sum of the coefficients of the alternative profit efficiency variable. In column (2), 
the sum of the coefficients of the alternative profit efficiency variable is negative and 
significant, indicating that progress in terms of alternative profit efficiency increases 
competition. Thus, efficiency also Granger-causes competition. The sum of the lagged 
Lerner indices is positive and significant, indicating positive conditional correlation. 
Market share is also positively associated with profit efficiency. This positive effect 
could reflect that banks that are large relative to the system have better access to 
production technologies so that they can increase profit efficiency more easily than 
smaller banks. In contrast, bank size in terms of total assets is inversely related to the 
dependent variable in column (1), suggesting that large institutions tend to benefit less 
from efficiency increases than smaller banks.   
[TABLE 3] 
To further explore the result in column (1) that market power impedes alternative 
profit efficiency, we add additional control variables that may also influence efficiency. In 
columns (3) and (4), we include asset growth, asset growth squared, HHI and the log of 
total banking system assets. Our previous results supporting the ‘Competition-Efficiency’-
Hypothesis are corroborated, and changes in profit efficiency again precede changes in the 20
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Lerner index.  The findings in columns (3) and (4) also illustrate significant effects of 
asset growth on alternative profit efficiency. Our results confirm that causality runs from 
competition to alternative profit efficiency and vice versa. The HHI and the log of total 
banking system assets enter negatively and significantly in column (3), indicating that 
banks operating in more concentrated and larger markets are less profit efficient. 
Columns (5) – (8) use the concept of cost efficiency. Here, we find that increases in market 
power precede increases in cost efficiency. This result is similar to the findings reported 
by Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2008) and Casu and Girardone (2007). We are cautious 
assigning too much weight to these results since we are interested in the overall effect of 
competition on bank efficiency. Recall that the concept of profit efficiency is seen as 
superior to cost efficiency as the concept of cost efficiency omits any inefficiencies on the 
revenue side. Moreover, our result could simply indicate that the efficiency improvement 
in terms of profit efficiency outweighs the decline in efficiency on the cost side.  
U.S. sample 
In Table 4, we repeat the analysis with the Granger causality tests for the U.S. sample. 
Column (1) in Table 4 illustrates again that the Lerner index is inversely related to 
alternative profit efficiency when the effect of market share and bank size is accounted for. 
Similarly, we detect negative conditional correlation for the sum of the lagged coefficients 
of alternative profit efficiency in column (1). The finding for an inverse relation between 
the sum of the coefficients of the Lerner index and alternative profit efficiency is also 
reiterated in column (3), when the additional controls are included. The results for the 
effect of competition on cost efficiency for the U.S. in columns (5) – (8) are again 
supportive for our main hypothesis. We therefore argue that the analysis for the U.S. 
sample provides further support for the ‘Competition-Efficiency’-Hypothesis. 
 [Table 4] 
 Robustness  tests 
To investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to the measurement of 
efficiency, we run Granger causality tests in Table 5 with efficiency scores based on the 
concept of standard profit efficiency.   
[Table 5] 
The findings with the standard profit efficiency measure lend some more support to 
our  ‘Competition-Efficiency’-Hypothesis. While the sum of the lagged coefficients of the 
Lerner index for the European sample in Panel A of Table 5 still enters with a negative 
sign implying that competition increases profit efficiency, the F-Statistics are not 
significant at conventional levels. In contrast, the results for the U.S. sample in Panel B 
are again fully aligned with the ‘Competition-Efficiency’-Hypothesis. In a further set of 
robustness checks based on the concept of alternative profit efficiency and using both 
samples reported in Appendix C, we use three annual lags of the dependent and 
independent variable to examine the sensitivity of our results to the lag structure. 
Additionally, we constrain the sample to those banks that remain in the sample during the 
whole period 1995–2005 to examine survivorship bias. All these tests confirm the 
‘Competition-Efficiency’-Hypothesis. 
In sum, increasing competition, as measured by the Lerner index, Granger causes 
profit efficiency. Our results indicate that bank managers respond to competitive pressure 21
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by keeping costs under control as well as increasing profits accordingly. In the remainder 
of the analysis, we focus on the link between competition, efficiency, and soundness 
exploiting the Boone indicator.  
  Testing the relation between the Boone indicator and bank soundness 
Table 6 presents the results of the test of the ‘Prudent and Efficient Management’- 
Hypothesis for European countries. For this analysis, we use the Boone indicator to gauge 




In column (1), only the Boone indicator enters the equation along with a number of 
bank-specific variables. The negative sign at the one percent level for the Boone indicator 
confirms the ‘Prudent and Efficient Management’-Hypothesis, and underscores that 
competition increases banks’ Z-scores via the efficiency channel.  
Among the control variables, we find that larger banks and banks with more 
diversified income streams tend to have higher Z-scores. In contrast, a higher ratio of loan 
loss provisions to total assets decreases Z-scores, and asset growth also significantly 
affects Z-scores.  
In columns (2) and (3), we additionally investigate whether the findings are altered if 
we take financial system characteristics and bank types into account.  
The Boone indicator remains negatively and significantly associated with the 
dependent variable when we control for bank types and country dummies in column (2). 
The dummy for cooperative banks enters positively and significantly, showing that these 
institutions have higher Z-scores than have commercial banks (the omitted category). In 
contrast, savings banks have significantly lower Z-scores relative to commercial banks. 
These regressions are run with a random effects panel data estimator because a fixed 
effects estimator would wipe out the time-invariant variables in these regressions. 
Column (3) furthermore controls for the HHI, banking system assets (log), and the 
macroeconomic environment. To this end, we include GDP per capita and the real 
interest rate. Banks that operate in more concentrated banking systems are less fragile, 
and Z-scores are higher in larger banking systems. The positive link between 
concentration and Z-scores supports the franchise value hypothesis according to which 
banks pursue low risk strategies when operating in a concentrated banking system (Boot 
and Greenbaum, 1993).   
The two macroeconomic variables show the anticipated sign. Real interest rates exhibit 
a negative relation to Z-scores, whereas GDP per capita enters the equations positively 
and significantly.  
In terms of the economic significance, the effect is also sizeable. Based on the results in 
columns (3), a one standard deviation decrease in the Boone indicator (0.22), increases the 
Z-score for the median bank in the sample from 22.5 to 26 standard deviations away from 
insolvency (0.22*(-15.7)=-3.5). The Hansen Sargan J-Test confirms the validity of our 
instruments in all regressions in Table 6.  22
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The regressions in Table 7 examine the ‘Prudent and Efficient Management’-Hypothesis 
for the U.S. sample.11  
The Boone indicator is rendered insignificant in column (1), indicating no marked 
effect of competition on bank soundness via the efficiency channel in the U.S. The 
regression in column (2) uses a random effects estimator and controls for bank type. The 
Boone indicator enters this equation at the one percent significance level with a negative 
sign, providing further support for the ‘Prudent and Efficient Management’-Hypothesis.  
Asset growth has again a significant effect on Z-scores, and loan loss provisioning goes 
hand in hand with declining Z-scores. The diversification index exhibits a negative sign, 
indicating that bank soundness declines in the U.S. if the institutions diversify into non-
interest earning activities. This result reflects that many small banks in the U.S. operate 
on a locally constrained basis that increases the correlation among their exposures (e.g. 
Stiroh, 2004a). The findings in column (3) in which we additionally consider a HHI 
calculated on the state level, total banking system assets (log), also calculated on the state 
level, and the two macroeconomic control variables are again indicating an inverse 
relation between competition and Z-Scores. However, the Boone indicator does not 
assume significance at conventional levels. We therefore remain cautious assigning much 
weight to these results. Rather, these findings suggest that the different environment in 
which U.S. institutions operate in is likely to determine the impact of competition on bank 
soundness via the efficiency channel. Before we however accept this view, we perform a 




We present robustness tests for the European sample, in Table 8 using alternative 
samples, and an alternative dependent variable. We also correct the standard errors of the 
Boone indicator to account for the fact that the indicator is derived from a regression. In 
columns (1)–(3) we replicate regression (3) from Table 6 and constrain the sample to 
commercial, savings, and cooperative banks respectively. While the negative and 
significant coefficient for the Boone indicator is confirmed in columns (2) and (3), the 
Boone indicator is rendered insignificant when we focus on commercial banks only in 
column (1). Although this finding appears somewhat surprising at first glance, it may 
reflect that the effect of competition on efficiency of commercial banks is less pronounced. 
In fact, this result is aligned with evidence in recent work by Casu and Girardone (2007). 
In their analysis of European commercial banks, they find no obvious effect of competition 
on efficiency.  
 [TABLE 8] 
Next, we remove Swiss banks from the sample to investigate sample selection 
problems in column (4) because the Swiss banking system was not subject to the above 
                                                 
11 We weight these regressions with total assets, to account for the fact that numerous small depositories 
are operating in local markets in the US.  23
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mentioned EU banking directives. To examine survivorship bias, we run the regressions 
in column (5) for those banks that remain in the sample during the period 1995–2005, and 
find no evidence for survivorship bias. The results indicate that our main finding for the 
beneficial effect of the Boone indicator on bank soundness is insensitive to sample 
selection.  
We employ an alternative dependent variable in column (6) in which we use the 
standard deviation of ROA as dependent variable. The standard deviation is computed 
over the sampling period 1995–2005. Since a time-invariant dependent variable hampers 
the use of a panel data estimator, we revert to OLS for this test. The coefficient of the 
Boone indicator enters again with a negative sign, but is rendered insignificant in this 
setup. Column (7) uses a bootstrapping procedure with 250 replications to correct the 
standard errors of the Boone indicator. Our inferences regarding the effect of this variable 
remain unchanged. 
U.S. Sample 
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of our results for the U.S. sample in Table 9. In 
columns (1) and (2), we constrain the sample to commercial and savings banks 
respectively.12 Although the Boone indicator enters with a negative sign, consistent with 
the predictions of the ‘Prudent and Efficient Management’-Hypothesis, the coefficient remains 
insignificant.  
[Table 9] 
When we run the analysis with banks that remain in the sample during 1995–2005 to 
investigate survivorship bias, the coefficient for the Boone indicator is again negative but 
also estimated with a large standard error. The indicator for competitiveness also remains 
insignificant in column (4), in which we use OLS to regress the standard deviation of 
ROA on the Boone indicator and the explanatory variables.  
Finally, we correct the standard errors of the Boone indicator with a bootstrapping 
procedure based on 250 replications in column (5). The indicator enters negatively, but 
does not assume significance at conventional levels. Therefore, we remain cautious about 
drawing strong inferences based on this result and conclude that these findings imply that 
competition, via the efficiency channel, may not be conducive to achieving a more sound 
banking system in the U.S. 
Our results also point towards a possible explanation for the positive link between 
market concentration and decreases in the probability of observing systemic crises 
reported in recent studies. Based on the evidence for a positive effect of competition on 
bank soundness via the efficiency channel in our empirical tests, and based on the efficient 
structure hypothesis according to which efficient firms increase market share at the 
expense of inefficient firms, we believe we have uncovered evidence that improvements in 
efficiency are the underlying reason for the results reported by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine (2006).  
V.  Conclusion 
We analyze the link between competition, efficiency, and bank soundness to establish 
the possible conduit through which competition can contribute to bank stability.  
                                                 
12   The number of cooperative banks in the U.S. sample is insufficient to run a regression for cooperative 
banks only.  24
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Using a large sample of data on European and U.S. banks, we find evidence for the 
‘Competition-Efficiency’-Hypothesis: competition measured by a Lerner index Granger-
causes profit efficiency of banks. We also find support for the idea that competition 
increases cost efficiency for the U.S. sample. These results are robust to alternative 
measures of efficiency, different lag structures, and also remain stable when we account 
for additional factors that exogenously affect bank efficiency.  
The findings for the European sample also confirm the ‘Prudent and Efficient 
Management’-Hypothesis. Instrumental variables regressions show that the Boone indicator 
enters the soundness regressions with a negative and significant sign, confirming that 
competition, via the efficiency channel, increases Z-scores. The analysis for the U.S. 
sample also weakly indicates a positive effect of competition on bank soundness through 
the efficiency channel. However, this finding is sensitive towards model specification and 
we are cautious about drawing strong inferences.  
The results presented in this paper are only partially consistent with the literature. 
While the evidence in favor of the ‘Competition-Efficiency’-Hypothesis is in line with a large 
literature in industrial organization relating to non-financial firms, our finding that 
competition, measured by the Boone indicator, is positively related to bank soundness, 
challenges the prevailing view both in the literature and in policymaking. We attribute 
this finding to the new methodology and the fact that we take endogeneity between 
measures of bank soundness and the Boone indicator into account.  
In terms of policy implications, our results highlight that competition in banking may 
be beneficial because: (i) it increases bank efficiency; and (ii) it increases soundness. Both 
are desirable from a policymaker’s point of view because a competitive banking system 
will allocate resources more efficiently to society, and because bank soundness is likely to 
improve. Our analysis gives empirical support to pro-competition policies such as the 
single banking passport, which simplified cross-border operation of banks, and the third 
pillar of Basel II, which puts emphasis on banks’ disclosures, increasing the role for 
market discipline in monitoring and enforcing efficiency and soundness. 
Two caveats are in order. First, while our sampling horizon spans a whole business 
cycle for Europe and the U.S., some caution needs to be exercised, since the competition-
efficiency relation may vary over time as both competition and efficiency are affected by 
regulatory policies and the riskiness of bank assets, which themselves vary over time. 
Second, the ‘Prudent and Efficient Management’-Hypothesis may be only one of the possible 
transmission mechanisms by which competition contributes to bank soundness. Other 
mechanisms and theories may also point towards a positive effect of competition on bank 
soundness. Further research would therefore be useful for understanding why 
competition can be beneficial for bank soundness.  25
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Appendix A:  Translog cost function for computation of Lerner index 
To calculate the Lerner index, we first estimate the following translog cost function with 
one output (total assets), three input factors (labor, deposits, and capital), and three 
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where C denotes total cost, and Y is total assets. As in Section III, W is the vector of 
inputs (labor, funding, and other costs), and netputs (fixed assets, loan loss provisions, and 
equity capital) are represented by the vector E. Standard homogeneity conditions are 
imposed by scaling all costs and input prices by one other input price (labor costs), and 
adjust for heteroskedasticity by scaling by equity capital.  
To obtain marginal cost, we differentiate Eq. (A.1) with respect to Y as follows 
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Appendix B:    First-stage regressions  
  Panel A: European sample  Panel B: U.S. sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








       
Market share (log)  0.0272**  0.9999***  0.0003  0.9995*** 
  (0.0108) (3.20e-08) (0.0031)  (0.0009) 
Financial  freedom  -0.0034*** -3.34e-08*** -0.0012***  -0.0001*** 
  (0.0002) (8.02e-10) (0.0001)  (0.0000) 
Total fixed asses/Total assets  0.4286*  -2.74e-07  -0.1709  -0.0081 
  (0.2241) (1.22e-06) (0.2706)  (0.0594) 
Equity/Total  assets  0.0000 -5.20e-17 0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.0000)  (1.29e-16)    (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Asset growth  -0.0828***  2.08e-08  0.0030  0.0009* 
  (0.0094)  (3.67e-08)    (0.0022)  (0.0005) 
Asset growth (squared)  0.0146***  3.13e-09  -0.0000  -0.0000* 
  (0.0055) (1.67e-08) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Loan loss provisions/Total assets  -0.0237***  4.78e-08***  0.0155***  0.0021** 
 (0.0035)  (1.34e-08  )  (0.0038)  (0.0009) 
Diversification index  0.0777***  1.61e-08  -0.0170  -0.0051 
  (0.0126) (7.30e-08) (0.0158)  (0.0034) 
Herfindahl Hirschman index  -0.1388**  8.68e-07***  -37.2712***  -10.1731*** 
  (0.0631) (1.53e-07) (0.2284)  (0.0580) 
Banking system assets (log)  -0.0017  0.9999***  0.3665***  0.6045*** 
  (0.0084) (2.86e-08) (0.0109)  (0.0026) 
Real interest rate  -0.0406***  -1.20e-07  0.0348***  -0.0010*** 
  (0.0016)  (5.46e-09)    (0.0005)  (0.0001) 
GDP per capita  -0.0000  -1.08e-11  0.0001***  0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (7.94e-12) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Observations  14463 14463 50032 50032 
Number of banks  3415  3415  9080  9080 
R-squared  0.1804 0.9999 0.9421 0.9998 
F-Statistic 350.55***  1.69e+14***  14642.44***  1.87e+06*** 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
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A l t e r n a t i v e   p r o f i t   e f f i c i e n c y  
( t o t a l )  
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Table 1: Summary statistics for translog functions 
 
  Panel A: European sample  Panel B: U.S. sample 
 N  Mean  Min  Max  N Mean  Min  Max 
Labor cost  20309 0.01  0.00  0.06 42352 0.02  0.00 0.13 
Funding cost  20309 0.03  0.01  0.13 42352 0.02  0.01 0.06 
Other cost  20309 1.21  0.18  20.97 42352 1.14  0.22 11.04 
Interest income/Loans  20300 0.17  0.00  382.47  42328 0.10  0.00 81.55 
Other income/Other earning 
assets  20308 0.04  -0.26  23.00 42334 0.01 -0.13  78.00 
Equity capital/Total assets  20309 0.07  0.00  0.50 42352 0.10  0.00 0.85 
Fixed assets/Total assets  20309 0.28  0.00  18.69 42352 0.20  0.00 7.67 
Loan loss provisions/Equity 
capital  20309 0.09  -0.49  14.78 42352 0.02 -0.41  17.55 
Total cost/Total assets  20309 0.05  0.01  0.32 42352 0.05  0.01 0.96 
Loans/Total assets  20309 0.59  0.00  1.00 42352 0.64  0.00 0.98 
Other earning assets/Total assets  20309 0.36  0.00  1.00 42352 0.29  0.00 0.98 
Alternative profit efficiency  20309 0.87  -35.51  1.00 42352 0.87 -4.94 1.00 
Standard profit efficiency   20299 0.86 -1891.1 1.00 42310 0.88 -5.29 1.00 
Cost efficiency  20299 0.88  0.07  1.00 42310 0.61  0.02 1.00 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Panel A: European sample  Panel B: U.S. sample 
  N Mean Min  Max  N Mean Min  Max 
Z-score  14389 27.19  2.64  274.04  50107 42.10  3.51  165.96 
Boone  indicator  14389  0.08 -0.95 0.54  50107  0.19 -0.16 0.33 
Total  assets  (log)  14389 13.00  7.98  21.19 50107 11.81  7.75  20.80 
Market share (log)  14389  -8.51  -13.06  -0.23  50107  -11.09  -15.07  -2.34 
Financial  freedom  14389  58.68 50.00 90.00  50107  86.08 70.00 90.00 
Total  fixed  assets/Total  assets  14389  0.02 0.01 0.16  50107  0.02 0.01 0.13 
Equity  capital/Total  assets 14389  0.07 0.01 0.48  50107  0.10 0.03 0.96 
Asset  growth  14389 0.06  -0.95  8.84 50107 0.13  -0.97  221.36 
Loan loss provisions/Total 
assets  14389  0.00 -0.06 0.13  50107  0.00 -0.04 0.21 
Diversification  index  14389  0.15 0.00 1.00  50107  0.31 0.00 1.00 
Herfindahl  Hirschman  index  14389  0.08 0.01 0.64  50107  0.0004  0.0001  0.0112 
Banking system assets (log)  14389  21.50  16.77  22.88  50107  18.5501  13.6595  21.2582 
Real  interest  rate  14389  7.27 0.78  10.38  50107  3.62 1.67 7.16 
GDP  per  capita  14389 22176.67 18009.77 40413.01 50107 35324.01 31716.04 37267.33 
Cooperative  bank  dummy  14389 0.59  0  1  50107 0.10  0  1 
Savings  bank  dummy  14389 0.26  0  1  50107 0.00  0  1 
Commercial  bank  dummy  14389 0.16  0  1  50107 0.89  0  1 34
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- 0 . 3 1 8 4   1 3 . 4 1 3 7   - 1 . 3 1 1 8   2 5 . 4 0 2 4  




4 4 2 7 . 5 9 * * *   3 5 1 8 . 3 7 * * *   1 9 4 4 . 1 6 * * *  

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
S t a n d a r d   p r o f i t   e f f i c i e n c y  
( t o t a l )
- 0 . 8 2 5 1  
- 0 . 0 0 0 2  
- 0 . 8 2 5 3  
- 0 . 0 0 0 2
- 0 . 5 3 0 1   - 0 . 0 0 4 0   - 0 . 5 2 2 1   - 0 . 0 0 7 3  
F - S t a t i s t i c
1 7 7 5 . 3 6 * * *  
2 . 1 1  
1 7 8 6 . 7 6 * * *  
2 . 3 8 *
1 0 7 1 . 0 0 * * *   7 7 . 1 7 * * *  





















































































































































































   
L e r n e r  
( t o t a l )
- 2 . 8 8 8 3  
0 . 5 8 2 9   - 3 . 6 8 2 2  
0 . 5 9 5 5
- 6 . 8 3 2 7   0 . 3 5 5 3  
- 5 . 7 5 8 8   0 . 2 6 6 5  
F - S t a t i s t i c
1 . 1 0   8 9 3 . 4 5 * * *  
1 . 1 1  
8 6 2 . 5 2 * * *
4 3 4 . 4 5 * * *   3 0 7 2 . 9 9 * * *  
2 8 1 . 7 8 * * *  
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Dependent variable  Z-Score  Z-Score  Z-Score 
      
Boone indicator  -15.8333***  -25.3312***  -15.6961*** 
 (3.9747)  (2.7555)  (2.9062) 
Total assets (log)  7.3427***  3.5874**  -6.4764*** 
 (2.0573)  (1.5548)  (0.6778) 
Equity/Total assets  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Asset growth  -5.4943***  -4.0039***  0.6168* 
 (1.0403)  (0.7539)  (0.3726) 
Asset growth (squared)  0.2469***  0.1943***  -0.0081 
 (0.0400)  (0.0297)  (0.0852) 
Loan loss provisions/Total assets  -0.7663***  -0.9019***  -0.8571*** 
 (0.2055)  (0.1026)  (0.1947) 
Diversification index  2.8923***  3.5635***  1.1590* 
 (0.9021)  (0.6269)  (0.7016) 
Herfindahl Hirschman index      3.8943* 
     (2.0692) 
Banking system assets (log)      0.3661** 
     (0.1768) 
Real interest rate      -0.7892*** 
     (0.1317) 
GDP per capita       0.0008*** 
     (0.0001) 
Cooperative bank    8.3224***   
   (2.2333)   
Savings bank    -3.1374**   
   (1.5323)   
Country dummies  No  Yes  No 
      






Observations 19172  19706  13872 
Number of banks  3098  3632  2872 
Hansen Sargan J-Statistic  2.123  n/a  0.958 
p-value 0.1451  n/a  0.3276 
      Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 Table 6: Boone indicator and Z-Score (European sample) 
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  Table 7: Boone indicator and Z-Score (U.S. sample) 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable  Z-score  Z-Score  Z-score 
 
      
Boone indicator  15.0697  -6.4351***  -39.7983 
 (13.8552)  (0.4865)  (34.2599) 
Total assets (log)  1.6474  -1.7145***  -2.6765 
 (1.2178)  (0.1129)  (2.8216) 
Equity/Total assets  0.0000**  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Asset growth  0.0932  -0.8773***  -0.7923 
 (0.6007)  (0.0748)  (0.7562) 
Asset growth (squared)  -0.0039  0.0182***  0.0151 
 (0.0115)  (0.0018)  (0.0152) 
Loan loss provisions/Total 
assets 
-1.1164 -1.4769*** 2.9806 
 (1.5096)  (0.0783)  (4.1154) 
Diversification  index  0.0853 -0.9727*** 3.7455 
 (2.1046)  (0.2822)  (2.6256) 
Herfindahl Hirschman index      -1.1818** 
     (0.5421) 
Banking system assets (log)      4.0160 
     (5.1516) 
Real interest rate      1.0284 
     (1.2174) 
GDP per capita      0.0033 
     (0.0024) 
Savings  Bank   -0.3529  
   (0.9397)   
Cooperative  bank   -10.3744  
   (15.9454)   
Observations 49776  50032  49776 
Number of banks  8824  9080  8824 
Hansen Sargan J-Test  2.706  n/a  1.985 
p-value  0.1000 n/a 0.1588 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; observations weighted by bank assets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Robustness 
te
sts for soundness regre
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